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iAbstract
This paper estimates the effect of minimum retail price policy imposed on vodka and other hard
liquor on the consumption of five alcoholic beverages: beer, dry wine, fortified wine, moonshine,
and vodka. Using the OLS with community fixed effect, it was found that men increased the
consumption of fortified wine by 4.94 percent and it could become an alternative to beverages that
became more expensive after the policy implementation. Moreover, the effect of policy differs
across age groups and sample restriction. In overall, policy increased the consumption of alcoholic
beverages with lower alcohol content but failed to decrease the consumption of vodka, which was
its primary goal.
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11 Introduction
The high consumption of alcohol with its harmful effects still remains a problem for many coun-
tries. The use of alcohol causes serious health, economic, and social consequences that hurt not
only drinkers themselves but the people around, which means that the whole society is affected.
Alcohol is a fluid with sedative, psychoactive qualities that generate dependency and intoxication
of the organism. The harm from its usage places alcohol in the top five risk factors for disability,
disease, and death (WHO, 2011).
The Russian Federation is one of the countries with the highest alcohol per capita consump-
tion in the world. It reaches fourth place by the volume of pure alcohol consumed after Belarus,
Moldova, and Lithuania (WHO, 2014). The reasons for such a trend goes back to the history of the
country when government encouraged to open drinking places and temporarily removed restriction
on distillation to increase government revenue. Drinking was the way for people to feel freedom
from the economic and social disorder. Hostile and cold climate of the country, little agricultural
potential also influence higher alcohol use (Nemtsov, 2005).
The consequences brought by excessive alcohol consumption are the indicators that a serious
problem actually exists. The alcohol-attributable fraction (AAF) for death from all other reasons
in the Russian Federation is very high. Approximately 30.5 percent of the deaths in the country
can be directly or indirectly attributed to the alcohol-related causes (WHO, 2014). According to
the Federal State Statistics Service, about 20 out of every 100,000 people die because of accidental
alcohol poisoning. Another alarming statistic is the number of people who are followed-up by the
dispensaries due to alcoholism and alcoholic psychosis, which is above 1,000 out of every 100,000.
This small sampling of statistical evidence clearly shows that the alcohol consumption brings very
2harmful effect (FSSS, 2015).
From the history of the country, the most massive and disputed anti-alcohol campaign was
implemented by Gorbachev government in 1985. This large-scale policy aimed at restricting the
availability of alcohol and increasing its price. The implemented measures were of an extremely
reformist origin. They imposed very strict prohibitions on the production and sales of alcohol to
make it hard to find and expensive to consume such drinks. Some strong moral, administrative and
political suppression was also used to make people stop drinking. While life expectancy and health
improved, such shock therapy resulted in a phenomenal increase of illegal alcohol production and
a rise in consumption of home-made liquor (moonshine). Such a contradictory effect shows that
there is a need for a more flexible and less harsh policy (Zaigraev, 2010).
The imposition of the excise tax 1 is long-standing practice in the Russian Federation (RF). It
has a long history so that it has been revised and modified in different periods of time. The modern
excise tax policy was set by the law of the RF of December 6, 1991, ”On Excises”. It is used
until today with subsequent changes and additions. Under federal law, different amounts of tax are
imposed on different types of alcoholic beverages, and they vary according to the amount of pure
spirit in the drink. That motivates people to drink beverages with a lower alcohol content because
of its lower price. The excise tax increases almost every year and even several times in a one-year
period. It also usually increases together with the inflation rate (Khaltourina and Korotayev, 2013).
The history of excise tax change is available in Tables A1 and A2 in Appendix.
The illegal alcohol sell is another serious and growing problem in the Russian Federation.
According to the Federal State Statistic Service, the production and sale of the vodka amounted to
1 This type of tax is an indirect tax included in the price of the specific goods that bring harm to the health. Such
taxes are imposed in order to decrease the consumption of unhealthy commodities such as alcohol and tobacco.
3120 and 176 million decaliters respectively, which means that the excise duties were not paid from
56 million decaliters sold in 2008. For the 2009 five-month period the excise tax revenue decreased
by 12.8 percent which is 28.7 billion roubles2. The reason for such consequences is the cheaper
selling price of illegal alcoholic beverages. Vodka, for instance, could be bought from 40 to 60
roubles per bottle which is unlikely to be of such a small amount if to account for the production
cost, excise and value added tax (www.gks.ru).
In order to address the problem of counterfeit alcohol market expansion, a specific new alcohol
pricing policy was implemented in 2010. It was decided to set minimum retail price (MRP) on
vodka and beverages with an alcohol content higher than 28 percent. That means that now the
0.5 bottle of some specific alcoholic drinks could not be bought less than the amount imposed by
the government. The policy was a first step to deal with cheap, low-quality alcohol, restrict its
availability, and increase price. Now with the equal minimum price of legal and illegal products,
individuals could choose one with the higher quality. In case of the positive policy results, the
government discussed to make extensions and impose it on other types of alcoholic beverages as
well.
Figure 1 shows the changing trend of newly introduced minimum retail price for two types
of beverages, average price, and average minimum price for vodka. The MRP is set per 0.5 liter
bottle and varies according to the amount of ethyl spirits in the drink. The initial price was 65
and 89 roubles for hard liquor (beverages with spirits content of more than 28 percent) and vodka,
respectively. It has an increasing trend over all three year period and reached 123 and 170 roubles
per bottle of hard liquor and vodka, respectively. The MRP values for each year are available
in Table A3 in Appendix. The figure also represents the average price values for vodka. As
2About 900 million dollars, according to the RF Central Bank 2009 average yearly exchange rate.
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Figure 1: Minimum retail and average prices per 0.5 lt, in roubles
Source: Expert Council of the Federal Service for Alcohol Market
Regulation, Unified Interdepartmental Information and Statistical System,
Russian Monitoring Longitudinal Survey
can be seen, the average vodka price (vodkaap) increased over time and is much higher than
the minimum retail vodka price (vodkam). As the average price includes the expensive vodka
as well and the policy set minimum price, it is worth looking at the average minimum price of
vodka trend (vodkaamp) which is taken from the community questionnaire of Russian Monitoring
Longitudinal Survey that collects the cheapest and most expensive prices of the goods. The average
minimum price has increased over the years too and its trend did not considerably change after the
policy implementation in 2010. At the same time, the trend after 2010 is very close to the vodka
minimum retail price so the price of the cheapest vodka bottle sold is almost equal to the policy
price value imposed. That can be one of the policy results that the price floor became a distinctive
5minimum selling price and excluded producers who underpriced.
In this paper, I will estimate the effect of MRP policy on consumption of five alcoholic bev-
erages — beer, dry wine, fortified wine, moonshine, and vodka — in the Russian Federation.
The work will also include the idea of rational addiction to see whether the past consumption of
alcoholic beverages influences its present consumption.
The study may be helpful in understanding the consumer demand for different types of alco-
hol, the possible reasons for change in demand, citizens’ response to the implementation of new
policies, and finally contribute to the set of more suitable and effective policies for the decrease of
alcohol consumption in the future.
The paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 will summarize previous studies on
the alcohol consumption and tax or policy implementation. Section 3 will present the dataset and
model. Section 4 will show the empirical results and Section 5 is a conclusion part.
2 Literature Review
There is an extensive number of works that have studied the relationship between alcohol con-
sumption and the excise tax or other control policy. However, most of these studies rely on research
conducted in the United States, Australia, United Kingdom or other European countries and still
very few works have focused on the Russian Federation.
The common theoretical model of rational addiction of Becker and Murphy (1988) is one of
the first models that develop an idea of the rational behaviour of addicted individuals. The theory
states that a certain good is known to be addictive if the increase in its past consumption leads to
an increase in its current consumption. At the same time, authors show that addicted individuals
6respond to changes in the price of the good. The effect of a permanent change in price on the
demand is initially small but it grows over time. And the long-run demand for addictive goods is
likely to be more elastic in comparison with demand for non-addictive goods.
A summary of economic literature made by Chaloupka et al. (2002) examines previous works
that estimated the change in price on alcohol consumption and alcohol abuse consequences among
teenagers and young adults across the US. They reported that heavy drinking may be reduced with
an increase in federal, state and local taxes on the alcoholic beverages. They also discuss that beer
is the most widely used drink among youths and its consumption is inelastic to the changes in
price.
Many meta-analysis works have studied the correlation between alcohol tax or price measures
and its sales. Gallet (2007) studied alcohol demand using 132 previous studies across 24 countries.
He reported that income, price, and advertising elasticities are sensitive to the addition of other
alcohol prices to the demand equation. Because of that, the optimal tax needs to take into account
the interdependencies in demand across alcohol drinks. It was also found that price elasticity
differs across age groups and beverage types, so when implementing a tax this difference should
be considered as well. Wagenaar et al. (2009) reviewed 112 studies in order to see whether drinking
has an inverse relationship with the anti-alcohol policies. The authors reported elasticity of -0.44
for alcohol in total. Therefore, they confirm that public policies that increase alcohol prices are
an effective way to decrease its consumption. It is additionally stated that the level of price effect
differs across various groups. Thus, the impact on heavy drinkers is less than on drinkers in general
(-0.28 of elasticity reported).
Meier et al. (2010) also studied the impact of change in price on drinking and purchasing
patterns in England. The work stated that minimum unit pricing policies are more likely to affect
7harmful drinkers in comparison with, for example, young alcohol users or all drinkers in gen-
eral. That is why the heterogeneity of the population should be considered when making decisions
regarding policy implementation. A similar idea was introduced by Holmes et al. (2012), who esti-
mated the impact of a newly introduced minimum unit pricing policy on different socio-economic
groups. They conclude that the policy would affect hard drinkers more than the moderate ones.
Thus, the consumption behaviour of hard drinkers decreased by 3.7 percent in comparison with the
overall 1.8 percent decrease. Hard drinkers with both low and high levels of income reduced their
alcohol consumption, but to a greater extent for those with the lower wage.
There is evidence that minimum pricing policy brings significant public health benefits. Stock-
well et al. (2012) claim that minimum pricing is a promising policy that might help to reduce health
problems resulting from excessive alcohol consumption. The study determined that a 10 percent
increase in the minimum prices decreased the consumption of various alcohol types by up to 22
percent. It also increased the government revenue and shifted the consumer preferences towards
the alcoholic beverages with lower spirit content. The public health benefits are also discussed in
the work of Zhao et al. (2013). The research investigates the relationship between minimum price
and the alcohol-attributable deaths between 2002-2009 in British Columbia, Canada. A 1 percent
increase in the minimum alcohol price resulted in about a 3 percent mortality decrease, which is a
considerable effect of a policy implementation.
Regarding the Russian Federation, there are several studies written in English relevant to this
work. The first one is a study by Andrienko and Nemtsov (2005), who examined the static and
dynamic demand for alcohol between 1994 and 2002. The work is based on the model of Becker
and Murphy, where past and future consumption together influences the addiction effect. The
estimated own-price elasticities vary from -1 to -3 for the different types of alcoholic drinks, so the
8important conclusion for policymakers is that an increase in price for any type of alcoholic drink
will lead to a decrease in its consumption.
Khaltourina and Korotayev (2013) reviewed the history of the most significant anti-alcohol
policies and tax implementations in the Russian Federation. The work’s main objective was to
identify the relationship between mortality and alcohol control policy measures. It was found that
the actions of denaturalization (reduction of the ethanol amount in the substances) implemented in
2006 have led to a reduction of mortality rate, which is the evidence that alcohol-related mortality
rate is highly influenced by the use of ethyl spirits. They also found that the increase of the excise
tax in the 2004-2012 period decreased the mortality in comparison with the 1998-1999 years when
the tax was decreased. The study also argues that the excise tax collection still remains an issue
for the country so that the pricing policies should be revised and combined together with the health
policies.
Another related work is the study of Goryakin et al. (2014) who explored the price elasticities
of the daily consumption of beer, home-made liquor, vodka, and different types of wine in Russia
for the 1994-2009 time period. They also estimated the price elasticities by group dividing the
sample by gender, education, and economic status. The fortified and table wines were found to be
substitutes for the cheap vodka. Also, the own-price elasticity for expensive vodka was found to
have a significant result of -0.019. At the same time, the study highlights that the implementation
of an effective policy is a very complicated issue. The increasing price of the product might change
the purchasing behaviour of the people, but usually does not cause decrease in alcohol consumption
and makes people shift to another type instead. That is why they conclude that the implementation
of only pricing and tax policies is not very helpful and some additional measures should be created.
In one of the recent studies, Yakovlev (2016) estimated the dynamic model of drinking be-
9haviour that included two important features of the Russian nation – heavy drinking with friends
and family (peer effect), and habit formation. The results reported that peer influence and habit per-
sistence increase the estimated price elasticity by 1.9 times for younger individuals, and by about
1.4 times for the older ones. The paper also studied the effect of heavy drinking on male mortality.
It found significant age heterogeneity so that drinking younger males have a higher mortality rate.
Moreover, it was estimated that a 50 percent tax on the vodka would save 1 percent young males
in 6 years.
In addition to the previous works, there is also a Russian language literature that studied the
effectiveness of ’pricing’ control policies in the country. They are mostly theoretical with little
empirical research. The common idea for most of the articles is that an increase in excise tax
or minimum prices does not bring the expected results in the reduction of alcohol consumption.
As the alcohol becomes less affordable, people are more likely to switch to counterfeit or home-
made products so consumption does not decrease overall. The regulations, conversely, worsen
the already existing problem of illegal alcohol market expansion (Isarov, 2001; Nemtsov, 2015;
Solov’ev, 2013; Zaigraev, 2001; Zhuk and Kizilova, 2013).
The different types of research described above have been conducted on the topic of alcohol
consumption and its consequences. At the same time, very little work has focused on the effect of
specific policy and alcohol consumption in the Russian Federation. Using all feasible information
from the previous studies, this work will be the first attempt to identify the effect of MRP policy
implementation on the consumption of alcoholic beverages.
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3 Data and Methodology
The study is based on the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS). This work used 2007
- 2013 period, taking 3 years before and after the MRP implementation. The survey is coordinated
by the Carolina Population Center at the University of North Carolina, in cooperation with the State
Committee on Statistics of the Russian Federation (http://www.cpc.unc.edu/rlms). The RLMS is
a household-based survey aimed at estimating the effects of Russian reforms on the economic
well-being of individuals and households. It has multi-stage probability sampling, and the primary
sampling units (PSU) are selected from geographically determined stratification. The number
of observations in the work is 77, 209 in total. Almost 75 percent of the sample reports being
an alcohol drinker (57, 855 people). There are 140 regions (communities) and 85 nationalities.
The majority people in the sample are represented by the Russian nationality (87 percent). Tatar,
Udmurt and Kabardian are the major representatives among other nationalities. The age of the
respondents was restricted to the range of 16 - 54 years for women and 16 - 59 years for men,
which is the population working age in the RF.
The information was collected in the form of an interview conducted by professional inter-
viewers. The data used were extracted from the adults, households and community questionnaires.
The first one provides information on socio-demographic elements and daily consumption of a
specific alcoholic beverage. The individuals were asked to answer whether they consumed various
alcoholic drinks in the last 30 days, and if they did, what was the amount of daily consumption of
that specific drink. The household questionnaire provides information on household income. The
community questionnaire gives the information on the availability of hot and cold water, sewerage,
and heating systems by regions. The prices were taken from the Unified Interdepartmental In-
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formation and Statistical System [Edinaia mezhvedomstvennaya informacionno-statisticheskaya
sistema, EMISS]. The database provides average consumer prices for different alcoholic bever-
ages by regions. The data for Gross Regional Product (GRP) was taken from the RF Federal State
Statistics Service. The income, prices for the alcoholic beverages, and GRP were deflated by the
consumer price index with the base year of 2013 to get the real values.
It is important to mention that the prices used in this work are average regional ones and no
minimum regional alcohol prices were available in the database. The RLMS community minimum
prices were not taken because of the many missing information in the data. As the study esti-
mates the effect of minimum retail prices increase, using minimum prices instead of average could
improve the regression results.
The regression results were obtained for different samples. The first one is a general sample
described above, which is restricted to the working age population only (16 - 59 years old). The
second one estimates the regression results for males and females separately. The next one is
limited to the respondents of Russian nationality to restrict national and religious differences. The
last one is restricted to the living region (urban or rural) to limit regional, economic and cultural
differences. Based on the main objective to identify the difference in alcohol consumption related
to the MRP implementation, this research will model the equation introduced by Goryakin et al.
(2014) with some additions:
Ln(CAict) = α + β1
∑
A
Ln(PAct ) + β2X
1
ct + β3X
2
ict + β4Policyt + γc + ict (1)
where CAict is an alcohol consumption of a definite type A of individual i from the community c at
time period t; P is a community-level average price vector for a specific beverage. X1ct is a vector
that contains community time-varying variables. These are the GRP values and dummy variables
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which respond to the availability of hot and cold water, sewerage, and a heating system. All these
considers the size of each region’s economy, its well-being and performance, and are proxies for
the potential public spending on infrastructure and the level of socio-economic development.
X2ict includes individual-level variables: age, dummies for gender, marital, health, and work-
ing status, years of education, household income level, number of children and dummy of whether
the person is on a maternity leave. Health status equals 1 if person has any chronic illness or di-
abetes, blood pressure, heart attack, and stroke. Working status equals 1 if person has a job and
0 otherwise. It also includes lagged income, working and alcohol consumption status. Alcohol
consumption status is a dummy variable that indicates whether the individual was alcohol con-
sumer previously or not. It equals 1 if person consumed alcohol last year and 0 if not. These are
the socio-demographic elements. Policy is the dummy variable which identifies the presence or
absence of the policy of interest. It equals 0 until 2009, before MRP implementation, and 1 after
it. γc is the community fixed effect and ict is an error term.
Under the policy implementation, the increase in the price of vodka may result in a substitution
effect – the people will decrease the consumption of a highly priced good and switch to more
affordable ones like beer, wine or moonshine. At the same time, the imposed high prices may
reduce the purchasing power of people and lead to the smaller demand of vodka. This is the
income effect. High prices typically will decrease the consumption of the good (vodka) but at the
same time, as expected, may have an effect on the consumption of other alcoholic drinks.
In general, the alcoholic beverages’ demand is non-positive with respect to the own-prices
increase. The changed price of vodka will most likely influence people to reduce its consumption.
The cross-price elasticity may have positive or negative value. The higher vodka price may, for
example, result in an increased demand for beer so the products are substitutes and can replace
13
each other. And vice versa, the demand for some type of wine can decrease, which means that the
drinks are complements and preferred to be used together.
4 Results
4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 represents the descriptive statistics of the socio-demographic characteristics of the respon-
dents by gender. For the general (16-59-year-old individuals) sample, males seem to be harder
drinkers. The average male is one year older and one year less educated in comparison with fe-
males. At the same time, the employment level is higher among men. 79 percent of men have a
job, which is 2 percent more in comparison with women.
Figure 2 shows the changing trend of per capita daily alcohol consumption average values for
five different types of drink between 2007 and 2013. Evidently, beer has the highest consumption
rate. Its consumption reached 350 grams per individual in 2007 and gradually decreased up to 280
grams in 2013. Beer has the lowest alcohol content among drinks which may be the reason for
such a high consumption. Vodka is also consumed a lot with a decreasing trend over time again.
Within 7 years, its consumption decreased from about 74 to 56 grams per individual. Dry wine is
moderately consumed; its maximum average daily consumption reaches up to 55 grams.
Fortified wine and moonshine are the least consumed drinks, with the average daily consump-
tion from approximately 7 to 15 grams per individual. Generally, the usage of all beverages expe-
rienced a moderate decrease.
It is notable that the consumption of vodka started to decrease more sharply after the 2010 year
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Males Females
Age (years) 36 35
Education (years) 12 13
Married (%) 58 52
Has a job (%) 79 77
Alcohol drinker (%) 78 71
Number of individuals 37, 236 39, 973
Table 1: Average socio-demographic characteristics
year
consumption
beer
dry wine
fortified wine
moonshine
vodka
policy
7 8 9 10 11 12 13
300
90
10
60
30
150
Figure 2: Average daily alcohol consumption per capita by beverage type,
in grams
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MRP implementation. Within the new policy, beverages with higher alcohol content became less
affordable which could lead to its lower consumption.
Next figure shows the average daily alcohol consumption only for individuals who reported to
be a drinker. Unlike in Figure 2, the consumption of beer has an increasing trend over the years.
Overall, its consumption increased from 827 to 937 grams per drinking individual.
year
consumption
beer
fortified wine
dry wine
moonshine
vodka
policy
7 8 9 10 11 12 13
850
450
350
250
Figure 3: Average daily alcohol consumption of drinkers by beverage
type, in grams
The consumption of moonshine, fortified wine, dry wine, and vodka seem to be on average
similar. As can be seen from the figure, the consumption of moonshine increased after the policy
implementation from 290 grams in 2010 to 310 grams in 2013. Interestingly, the fortifies wine
consumption had an increasing trend up to the 2010 and started to decline after that. It firstly
experienced a distinct decline in 2011 and then started to decrease in a more gradual way. The
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consumption of dry wine and vodka almost did not change with very small consumption increase
over the 6-year period.
Overall, there is a small change in the consumption of moonshine and fortified wine after the
policy implementation in 2010 for those who reported being a drinker. Together with the beer
increasing consumption pattern, both beer and moonshine cold become a cheaper alternative to
the beverages increased in price and that is why started to be consumed more. At the same time,
there is no considerable change in the consumption behaviour for both drinkers and population as
a whole. The policy probably did not significantly changed the consumption of vodka or other
beverages. It is likely that the individuals did not become drinking notably less but implemented
price floor primarily resulted in the alcohol quality increase or illegal alcohol sale decrease, which
were the primary policy goals.
4.2 Empirical Results
4.2.1 General Results
Table 2 shows the general results – the effect of MRP policy on the alcohol consumption of a pooled
sample from 2007 to 2013 restricted to the working population age. The fixed effect is included
in order to control for the average difference in the community groups. As can be seen, the policy
does not have a main significant effect on the consumption of alcoholic beverages after 2010 until
2013. Despite that the new law was oriented to the vodka price change, the policy showed no
significant effect on its consumption. At the same time, if to look at policy effect on different
groups, there is a policy effect that changed the consumption of some drinks. In comparison with
a base group (16-25 years old individuals), the individuals from age group 2 (45-59 years old)
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tend to increase their consumption of beer with the implementation of policy. In comparison with
females, males seem to decrease the consumption of vodka by some extent after the MRP.
The law stimulated an increase in consumption of beverage with a lower alcohol content (beer),
which is due to the income effect. In fact, vodka consumption significantly decreased only for male
group. It is also seen that some demographic characteristic variables have significant values. Being
a male is positively related to the consumption while having a job and more years of education
have the opposite relationship. Thus, for example, the working person consumes lower amount of
moonshine, and vodka by 13.6 and 8.3 percent, respectively. In comparison with single individuals
(base group), married people consume less beer, fortified wine, moonshine, and vodka; widows and
widowers consume less moonshine as well. The higher household income resulted in the lower
consumption of moonshine, while its lagged value decreases the consumption of all beverages
except moonshine.
Interestingly, the present consumption of alcoholic beverages was highly influenced by its pre-
vious year consumption, which shows an additive nature of drinking. Thus, if the individual con-
sumed alcohol last year, his or her consumption of beer, dry wine, fortified wine, moonshine, and
vodka increased by 14.1, 9.8, 10.4, 11.7, and 11.8 percent in the current period, respectively.
Additionally, dry wine appear to be the substitute good with moonshine and fortified wine.
The cross-price elasticities are positive and significant which mean that a 10 percent dry wine
price increase results in 5.9 percent moonshine and 3.4 fortified wine consumption increase.
Vodka and fortified wine were found to be substitutes as well. At the same time, the fortified
wine own-price elasticity is significant and equals to -0.83.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
beer,gr dry wine, gr fortified wine, gr moonshin, gr vodka, gr
beer, rub 0.014 -0.105 -0.065 -0.760 -0.165
(0.077) (0.095) (0.161) (0.195) (0.072)
dry wine, rub 0.071 0.009 0.349* 0.598* 0.166
(0.121) (0.161) (0.203) (0.317) (0.114)
fortified wine, rub -0.023 0.070 -0.835*** -0.590 -0.085
(0.067) (0.092) (0.189) (0.374) (0.115)
vodka, rub 0.083 -0.025 0.596*** 0.302 0.137
(0.067) (0.092) (0.176) (0.188) (0.088)
policy -0.053 -0.061 -0.025 -0.136 -0.095
(0.053) (0.078) (0.133) (0.189) (0.076)
gender (male) 0.529*** 0.242*** 0.430*** 0.472*** 0.542***
(0.023) (0.044) (0.053) (0.072) (0.019)
age group 1 (26-45) -0.001 0.021 -0.104 -0.055 0.011
(0.033) (0.066) (0.108) (0.156) (0.057)
age group 2 (46-59) -0.173*** -0.158** -0.213 -0.013 -0.058
(0.037) (0.064) (0.134) (0.166) (0.060)
policy*age group 1 0.048 0.009 0.089 0.255 0.115
(0.046) (0.077) (0.120) (0.189) (0.075)
policy*age group 2 0.084* 0.108 0.110 0.205 0.103
(0.047) (0.076) (0.143) (0.204) (0.070)
policy*gender (male) -0.004 -0.065 -0.057 -0.025 -0.038*
(0.023) (0.051) (0.060) (0.063) (0.023)
alcohol consumer, lag 0.141*** 0.098*** 0.104** 0.117* 0.118***
(0.024) (0.029) (0.046) (0.065) (0.027)
educ. years -0.014*** -0.004 -0.023*** -0.031*** -0.020***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.011) (0.004)
married -0.072*** -0.051 -0.108** -0.245*** -0.074**
(0.024) (0.062) (0.052) (0.077) (0.034)
divorced 0.023 0.005 0.015 0.016 0.035
(0.028) (0.061) (0.062) (0.089) (0.038)
widowed/er 0.034 0.063 0.046 -0.194* -0.001
(0.046) (0.062) (0.092) (0.116) (0.052)
household income -0.010 -0.003 -0.012 -0.021* -0.007
(0.006) (0.008) (0.014) (0.012) (0.005)
household income, lag -0.010* 0.013*** -0.026** 0.001 -0.013***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.011) (0.013) (0.005)
job -0.031 -0.030 -0.072 -0.136** -0.083***
(0.020) (0.029) (0.045) (0.058) (0.020)
job, lag -0.035** 0.031 0.009 -0.083* -0.053**
(0.018) (0.030) (0.061) (0.046) (0.022)
health status 0.022* -0.026 0.019 0.045 -0.011
(0.013) (0.020) (0.034) (0.043) (0.014)
GRP 0.017 0.340** -0.091 0.233 0.040
(0.086) (0.135) (0.171) (0.234) (0.079)
N 12,405 5,298 1,852 1,162 10,867
R2 0.176 0.047 0.117 0.220 0.173
1 number of children variable and dummy for maternity leave are included;
2 community level dummies of hot/cold water supply, heating and sewerage systems are included;
3 robust standard errors;
4 consumption, price, income, and GRP values are in the log form.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 2: The effect of MRP policy on alcohol consumption by the type of drink. OLS with community
fixed effect
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As have been revised in the previous parts, the heterogeneity of population is an important
factor for consideration while estimating the policy effect. For that matter, the next three sections
of the work will restrict the results for several samples.
4.2.2 Gender
This section will show the consumption of alcoholic beverages for males and females separately
to see the difference in consumption patterns by gender. Table 3 reports the effect of MRP policy
on male alcohol consumption. The table results show that under the policy implementation males
increased the consumption of fortified wine by 4.94 percent. Because of the increased vodka price
resulted from policy, the individuals increased the fortified wine consumption, which could become
a cheaper alternative to vodka.
The consumption of beverages also varies according to age groups. Both age groups consume
more fortified wine in comparison with the base group but the interaction term between policy
and age is significantly negative for the fortified wine. Dry wine and moonshine were found to
be substitutes with the cross price elasticity of 0.10. The own price elasticity of fortified wine is
-0.89 for men. Past alcohol consumption influenced the current consumption of beer. We can see
that previous year alcohol consumption increased the current beer consumption by 7.4 percent.
Drinking is an addictive habit for males as well.
Table 4 represents the effect of MRP policy on female alcohol consumption. The policy did not
have the main effect on the consumption of any five beverages. At the same time, when looking
at the effect of policy on different age groups we can see that, in comparison with base age group,
females who are between 46 and 54 increased their beer and dry wine consumption, and those who
are between 26 and 45 increased the consumption of moonshine. Overall, the policy resulted in
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a reverse effect, in which the consumption of drinks other than vodka increased. The result is in
line with the Russian language literature revised in the previous section that states that the pricing
policies do not decrease the consumption of alcoholic beverages but just make people switch to
its another types. The previous alcohol consumption affects the current consumption of beer for
females too and one more time shows that considering addiction is important.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
beer, gr dry wine, gr fortified wine, gr moonshine, gr vodka, gr
beer, rub 0.065 -0.437 0.213 -0.874 -0.167
(0.111) (0.226) (0.419) (0.266) (0.093)
dry wine, rub -0.008 -0.153 0.253 0.100*** 0.084
(0.155) (0.415) (0.617) (0.349) (0.116)
fortified wine, rub -0.043 0.402 -0.894** -0.813 -0.061
(0.090) (0.262) (0.447) (0.196) (0.122)
vodka, rub 0.105 -0.349 0.698** 0.350 0.171
(0.078) (0.204) (0.305) (0.219) (0.193)
policy -0.027 0.076 0.0494* -0.129 -0.107
(0.078) (0.263) (0.265) (0.176) (0.075)
age group 1 (26-45) -0.012 0.205 0.379** 0.059 -0.014
(0.059) (0.228) (0.160) (0.107) (0.061)
age group 2 (45-59) -0.144*** 0.049 0.347** 0.113 -0.041
(0.055) (0.222) (0.155) (0.115) (0.066)
policy*age group 1 0.027 -0.214 -0.405* 0.186 0.098
(0.067) (0.254) (0.240) (0.156) (0.077)
policy*age group 2 0.050 -0.103 -0.433* 0.160 0.072
(0.068) (0.258) (0.226) (0.160) (0.073)
alcohol consumer, 1ag 0.074** 0.021 0.046 0.081 0.040
(0.033) (0.076) (0.128) (0.069) (0.033)
N 7,531 1,045 566 874 7,250
R2 0.022 0.049 0.106 0.120 0.028
1 the same explanatory variables are used;
2 robust standard errors;
3 consumption, price, income, and GRP values are in the log form.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3: The effect of MRP policy on male alcohol consumption by the type of drink. OLS with
community fixed effect
The consumption of beverages again varies according to age groups. The own-price fortified
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wine elasticity equals to -0.80. Vodka was found to be substitute with dry wine and fortified wine
for females. The result look reasonable as women mostly prefer beverages with lower alcohol
content.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
beer, gr dry wine, gr fortified wine, gr moonshine, gr vodka, gr
beer, rub -0.053 -0.029 -0.164 -0.430 -0.168
(0.081) (0.090) (0.243) (0.279) (0.071)
dry wine, rub 0.178 0.041 0.454* -0.104 0.393**
(0.151) (0.184) (0.258) (0.127) (0.193)
fortified wine, rub 0.011 0.022 -0.801*** -0.042 -0.144
(0.092) (0.095) (0.261) (0.429) (0.158)
vodka, rub 0.034 0.048 0.427** 0.540 0.010
(0.093) (0.101) (0.187) (0.368) (0.112)
policy -0.095 -0.078 -0.155 -0.202 -0.116
(0.076) (0.072) (0.152) (0.319) (0.161)
age group 1 (26-45) 0.017 -0.017 -0.204 -0.361 0.054
(0.042) (0.065) (0.132) (0.232) (0.101)
age group 2 (46-54) -0.262*** -0.200*** -0.361** -0.286 -0.099
(0.053) (0.066) (0.145) (0.228) (0.104)
policy*age group 1 0.062 0.030 0.171 0.647** 0.129
(0.063) (0.076) (0.139) (0.303) (0.148)
policy*age group 2 0.116* 0.122* 0.196 0.355 0.120
(0.066) (0.073) (0.151) (0.312) (0.151)
alcohol consumer, lag 0.202*** 0.112*** 0.142*** 0.118 0.233***
N 4,874 4,253 1,286 288 3,617
R2 0.058 0.038 0.049 0.253 0.053
1 the same explanatory variables are used;
2 robust standard errors;
3 consumption, price, income, and GRP values are in the log form.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 4: The effect of MRP policy on female alcohol consumption by the type of drink. OLS with
community fixed effect
4.2.3 Nationality
As discussed earlier, the majority of the sample appears to be Russian. That is why it was attractive
to compare the difference between alcohol consumption among Russian people and other national-
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ities in order to control for the cultural and religious differences. The regression results presented
in Table 5 are performed on a sample containing Russian nationality only.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
beer, gr dry wine, gr fortified wine, gr moonshine, gr vodka, gr
beer, rub 0.036 -0.138 0.043 -0.746 -0.160
(0.077) (0.118) (0.174) (0.168) (0.070)
dry wine, rub 0.027 -0.040 0.187 0.660** 0.117
(0.113) (0.157) (0.212) (0.259) (0.113)
fortified wine, rub 0.033 0.126 -0.714*** -0.646 -0.024
(0.068) (0.101) (0.203) (0.196) (0.117)
vodka, rub 0.054 -0.044 0.500** 0.446** 0.106
(0.070) (0.101) (0.195) (0.225) (0.090)
policy -0.061 -0.095 -0.083 -0.174 -0.085
(0.056) (0.078) (0.144) (0.188) (0.082)
gender (male) 0.532*** 0.246*** 0.437*** 0.489*** 0.538***
(0.025) (0.048) (0.064) (0.077) (0.020)
age group 1 (26-45) -0.009 -0.005 -0.076 -0.004 0.037
(0.037) (0.065) (0.108) (0.162) (0.067)
age group 2 (46-59) -0.166*** -0.180** -0.249* -0.008 -0.051
(0.040) (0.069) (0.133) (0.175) (0.070)
policy*age group 1 0.062 0.035 0.076 0.269 0.084
(0.051) (0.078) (0.126) (0.199) (0.080)
policy*age group 2 0.089* 0.145* 0.147 0.263 0.095
(0.052) (0.080) (0.155) (0.211) (0.074)
policy*gender (male) -0.008 -0.077 -0.035 -0.008 -0.035
(0.024) (0.054) (0.065) (0.078) (0.023)
alcohol consumer, lag 0.129*** 0.089*** 0.080* 0.130* 0.129***
(0.024) (0.033) (0.042) (0.074) (0.027)
N 11,191 4,824 1,666 939 9,349
R2 0.178 0.044 0.121 0.229 0.174
1 the same explanatory variables are used;
2 robust standard errors;
3 consumption, price, income, and GRP values are in the log form.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 5: The effect of MRP policy on alcohol consumption by the type of drink for Russian nationality.
OLS with community fixed effect
The effect of the policy is again different across different to age groups. After the MRP im-
plementation, in comparison with the base group, the Russian people aged between 46 and 59
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increase their consumption of beer and dry wine. As these drinks are less expensive and less taxed,
individuals could choose to consume it to a higher extent.
Moonshine were found to substitute with dry wine and vodka for Russian people. For instance,
a 10 percent dry wine price increase resulted in 6.60 percent moonshine consumption increase.
The results look reasonable, as Russian people could be more familiar with home moonshine pro-
duction so that it is substitute with other drinks. Own-price fortified wine elasticity is significant
too and equals -0.71. The increase of current alcohol consumption was influenced by past alcohol
consumption from 8 to 13 percent for Russian nationality.
4.2.4 Community
This section will display the alcohol consumption determinants according to the living community,
or living region. The Russian Federation is the largest country and, consequently, has different
regional economies, infrastructure development levels, population size and other characteristics
among its communities. In order to count for the consumption difference among different com-
munities, we estimate the effect of MRP policy on alcohol consumption for urban and rural areas
separately.
The effect of policy on urban citizens is reported in Table 6. The policy was influential for
urban citizens aged between 26-45 for moonshine, and for beer and moonshine for those who are
aged between 46-59. There are some significant price elasticities. The dry wine price and fortified
wine consumption are positively related, so the goods are substitutes. The own-price elasticity of
fortified wine is -0.92. Vodka and fortified wine are substitutes too. Previous alcohol consumption
again influenced the beverages’ consumption to a high extent (from 10.3 to 16.3 percent).
Table 7 displays the results for rural area citizens only. There is no policy effect under this com-
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munity restriction. Males consume more of all alcoholic beverages in comparison with females.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
beer, gr dry wine, gr fortified wine, gr moonshine, gr vodka, gr
beer, rub -0.031 -0.166 -0.154 -0.593 -0.178
(0.083) (0.103) (0.184) (0.320) (0.075)
dry wine, rub 0.071 0.262 0.647** 0.465 0.175
(0.166) (0.188) (0.261) (0.754) (0.147)
fortified wine, rub -0.029 0.077 -0.929*** -0.398 0.019
(0.063) (0.093) (0.188) (0.334) (0.108)
vodka, rub 0.058 -0.095 0.425* 0.149 0.088
(0.086) (0.105) (0.222) (0.404) (0.120)
policy -0.081 -0.068 -0.051 -0.0564 -0.136
(0.064) (0.091) (0.144) (0.273) (0.102)
gender (male) 0.477*** 0.239*** 0.372*** 0.651*** 0.519***
(0.026) (0.050) (0.053) (0.117) (0.020)
age group 1 (26-45) -0.029 0.021 -0.161 -0.402* 0.003
(0.038) (0.076) (0.133) (0.230) (0.079)
age group 2 (46-59) -0.220*** -0.172** -0.319* -0.357 -0.071
(0.042) (0.071) (0.161) (0.274) (0.083)
policy*age group 1 0.047 0.009 0.080 0.657** 0.145
(0.056) (0.088) (0.118) (0.285) (0.102)
policy*age group 2 0.101* 0.116 0.157 0.646* 0.132
(0.056) (0.089) (0.146) (0.341) (0.095)
policy*gender (male) 0.008 -0.066 -0.026 -0.091 -0.015
(0.028) (0.057) (0.068) (0.104) (0.027)
alcohol consumer, lag 0.141*** 0.103*** 0.073 0.046 0.163***
N 8,723 4,208 1,289 484 7,528
R2 0.156 0.050 0.110 0.254 0.168
1 the same explanatory variables are use;
2 robust standard errors;
3 consumption, price, income, and GRP values are in the log form.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 6: The effect of MRP policy on alcohol consumption by the type of drink for urban citizens. OLS
with community fixed effect
There is still an effect of previous alcohol consumption for rural area citizens but the number
of observation is also small under this regional sample restriction. For example, if the person
consumed alcoholic beverages last year, the consumption of beer increased by 13 percent. Such an
increase one more time shows that drinking is an addictive habit. The dry wine own price elasticity
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was fond to be -0.478. Additionally, vodka was found to be a substitute with fortified wine and
moonshine.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
beer, gr dry wine, gr fortified wine, gr moonshine, gr vodka, gr
beer, rub 0.283 0.382 0.375 -0.139 -0.022
(0.149) (0.255) (0.493) (0.323) (0.165)
dry wine, rub -0.001 -0.478* -0.208 0.100 0.212
(0.189) (0.272) (0.405) (0.319) (0.186)
fortified wine, rub -0.050 -0.240 -0.345 -0.872 -0.545
(0.244) (0.385) (0.526) (0.314) (0.215)
vodka, rub 0.121 0.172 0.544* 0.559*** 0.263
(0.112) (0.244) (0.280) (0.205) (0.128)
policy -0.024 -0.014 -0.157 0.122 0.022
(0.102) (0.164) (0.224) (0.203) (0.103)
gender (male) 0.661*** 0.271** 0.632*** 0.361*** 0.598***
(0.043) (0.106) (0.117) (0.061) (0.041)
age group 1 (26-45) 0.065 0.047 -0.094 0.157 0.048
(0.061) (0.132) (0.185) (0.169) (0.077)
age group 2 (46-59) -0.066 -0.071 -0.116 0.165 -0.006
(0.070) (0.140) (0.226) (0.153) (0.077)
policy*age group 1 0.065 -0.000 0.198 0.095 0.023
(0.084) (0.172) (0.237) (0.190) (0.099)
policy*age group 2 0.063 0.062 0.119 0.069 0.017
(0.090) (0.167) (0.265) (0.179) (0.098)
policy*gender (male) -0.030 -0.015 -0.190* -0.034 -0.096**
(0.044) (0.134) (0.114) (0.081) (0.046)
alcohol consumer, lag 0.130*** 0.085 0.139** 0.160** 0.052
(0.041) (0.052) (0.067) (0.078) (0.040)
N 3,682 1,090 563 678 3,339
R2 0.238 0.077 0.223 0.235 0.201
1 the same explanatory variables are use;
2 robust standard errors;
3 consumption, price, income, and GRP values are in the log form.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 7: The effect of MRP policy on alcohol consumption by the type of drink for rural citizens. OLS
with community fixed effect
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5 Conclusion
This study finds empirical evidence that the implementation of the MRP policy on vodka and
hard liquor changes the consumption of some alcoholic beverages other than vodka. The changed
price of vodka and hard liquor mostly resulted in the higher use of other alcoholic beverages. The
implemented policy affected only male vodka consumption.
The effect of policy differs on sample restriction. In comparison with females, males were more
influenced by policy and increased their fortified wine consumption by 4.94 percent. At the same
time, MRP affects different age groups and gender differently. Previous alcohol consumption has
a significantly high effect on the current consumption of beer, dry wine, fortified wine, moonshine,
and vodka. The results show that past consumption is much more influential than the change in
beverage prices or policy.
Even though the policy was implemented to impose the minimum price of vodka and hard
liquor, other types of alcohol were influenced to a higher extent. Particularly, the individuals
did not decrease their consumption of vodka and at the same time switched to other alcoholic
beverages to some extent. The consumption of alcohol did not decrease overall, which is in line
with the conclusion of other studies on Russia reviewed in this paper that state that the pricing
policies result in a reverse effect that makes people switch to more affordable beverages. At the
same time, the strong effect of addiction habit is another possible reason for small policy effect.
No matter of price, individuals do not change the consumption patterns due to the addiction to
alcohol. Moreover, one of the main goals of the policy was to improve the alcohol quality so it was
not just oriented at decreasing alcohol consumption, but tried to improve some health conditions
and make people choose more affordable alternatives to hard drinks like vodka.
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The conclusion shows that the price floor imposed on vodka did not decrease its consumption
and conversely increased the consumption of other alcoholic beverages. That one more time proves
that setting appropriate policy is complex work that needs careful estimation and combination with
other regulations.
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Appendix
Year Document
2001
Nalogoviy kodeks Rossiyskoy Federacii ot [Tax Code of
Russian Federation on] 05.08.2000 N117-FZ
2002 Federalniy zakon ot [Federal law on] 07.08.2001 N118-FZ
2003 Federalniy zakon ot [Federal law on] 24.07.2002 N110-FZ
2004 Federalniy zakon ot [Federal law on] 07.07.2003 N117-FZ
2005 Federalniy zakon ot [Federal law on] 28.07.2014 N86-FZ
2006 Federalniy zakon ot [Federal law on] 21.07.2005 N107-FZ
2007 Federalniy zakon ot [Federal law on] 26.07.2006 N134-FZ
2008 Federalniy zakon ot [Federal law on] 16.05.2007 N75-FZ
2009 Federalniy zakon ot [Federal law on] 22.07.2008 N142-FZ
2010 Federalniy zakon ot [Federal law on] 28.11.2009 N282-FZ
2011 Federalniy zakon ot [Federal law on] 27.11.2010 N306-FZ
2012 Federalniy zakon ot [Federal law on] 28.11.2011 N338-FZ
2013 Federalniy zakon ot [Federal law on] 29.11.2012 N203-FZ
2014 Federalniy zakon ot [Federal law on] 30.09.2013 N269-FZ
2015 Federalniy zakon ot [Federal law on] 24.11.2014 N366-FZ
Table A1: List of Excise Tax Law documents
Source: Official Internet Resources of the President of Russia
32
Pr
od
uc
tt
yp
e
–
Pe
ri
od
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
01
.0
1
-3
0.
06
20
12
1.
07
-3
1.
12
20
12
20
13
20
14
20
15
C
ha
m
pa
gn
e,
sp
ar
kl
in
g,
an
d
ef
fe
rv
es
ce
nt
w
in
es
9.
45
10
.5
8
10
.5
10
.5
10
10
.5
10
.5
10
.5
10
.5
14
18
22
22
24
25
25
N
at
ur
al
w
in
es
(e
xc
ep
tc
ha
m
pa
gn
e,
sp
ar
kl
in
g,
an
d
ef
fe
rv
es
ce
nt
w
in
es
)
3.
15
3.
52
4
4
2.
2
2.
2
2.
2
2.
35
2.
6
3.
5
5
6
6
7
8
8
W
in
es
(e
xc
ep
tn
at
ur
al
w
in
es
)
36
.7
5
41
.2
47
.5
52
95
11
2
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
B
ee
rw
ith
et
hy
ls
pi
ri
tc
on
te
nt
le
ss
th
an
0.
5
pe
rc
en
t
-
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
B
ee
rw
ith
et
hy
ls
pi
ri
tc
on
te
nt
be
tw
ee
n
0.
5
an
d
8.
6
pe
rc
en
t
1
1.
12
1.
4
1.
55
1.
75
1.
91
2.
07
2.
74
3
9
10
12
12
15
18
18
B
ee
rw
ith
et
hy
ls
pi
ri
tc
on
te
nt
m
or
e
th
an
8.
6
pe
rc
en
t
3.
3
3.
7
4.
6
5.
3
6.
28
6.
85
7.
45
8.
94
9.
8
14
17
21
21
26
31
31
A
lc
oh
ol
ic
be
ve
ra
ge
s
w
ith
et
hy
ls
pi
ri
tc
on
te
nt
le
ss
th
an
9
pe
rc
en
t(
ex
ce
pt
w
in
es
)
-
-
-
-
76
83
-
11
0
12
1
15
8
19
0
23
0
27
0
32
0
40
0
40
0
A
lc
oh
ol
ic
be
ve
ra
ge
s
w
ith
et
hy
ls
pi
ri
tc
on
te
nt
m
or
e
th
an
9
pe
rc
en
t(
ex
ce
pt
w
in
es
)
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
17
3.
5
19
1
21
0
23
1
25
4
30
0
40
0
50
0
50
0
A
lc
oh
ol
ic
be
ve
ra
ge
s
w
ith
et
hy
ls
pi
ri
tc
on
te
nt
m
or
e
th
an
25
pe
rc
en
t(
ex
ce
pt
w
in
es
)
-
-
-
-
14
6
15
9
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
A
lc
oh
ol
ic
be
ve
ra
ge
s
w
ith
et
hy
ls
pi
ri
tc
on
te
nt
be
tw
ee
n
9
an
d
25
pe
rc
en
t(
ex
ce
pt
w
in
es
)
-
-
-
-
10
8
11
8
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
A
lc
oh
ol
ic
be
ve
ra
ge
s
w
ith
et
hy
ls
pi
ri
tc
on
te
nt
le
ss
th
an
6
pe
rc
en
t(
ex
ce
pt
w
in
es
)
-
-
-
-
-
-
16
2
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
N
at
ur
al
w
in
es
(e
xc
ep
tu
nt
ra
di
tio
na
l
un
fo
rt
ifi
ed
on
es
)
-
-
2
2.
2
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
U
nt
ra
di
tio
na
lf
or
tifi
ed
w
in
es
-
-
75
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
C
id
er
,p
er
ry
,m
ea
d
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
8
8
Ta
bl
e
A
2:
Fe
de
ra
le
xc
is
e
ta
x
ra
te
s
on
al
co
ho
lic
be
ve
ra
ge
s,
in
ro
ub
le
s
pe
r1
lit
re
of
dr
in
k
So
ur
ce
:O
ffi
ci
al
In
te
rn
et
R
es
ou
rc
es
of
th
e
Pr
es
id
en
to
fR
us
si
a
33
Date of
implementation
Price for vodka,
in roubles
per 0.5 bottle
Price for hard liquor,
in roubles
per 0.5 bottle
Document
01.01.2010 89 65
Prikaz RAR ot [Order of the Expert Council of the Federal
Service for Alcohol Market Regulation on] 30.11.2009 N17n
01.01.2011 98 71
Prikaz RAR ot [Order of the Expert Council of the Federal
Service for Alcohol Market Regulation on] 06.12.2010 N63n
01.07.2012 125 91
Prikaz RAR ot [Order of the Expert Council of the Federal
Service for Alcohol Market Regulation on] 30.05.2012 N131
08.01.2013 170 123
Prikaz RAR ot [Order of the Expert Council of the Federal
Service for Alcohol Market Regulation on] 13.12.2012 N372
11.03.2014 199 144
Prikaz RAR ot [Order of the Expert Council of the Federal
Service for Alcohol Market Regulation on] 28.01.2014 N9
01.08.2014 220 160
Prikaz RAR ot [Order of the Expert Council of the Federal
Service for Alcohol Market Regulation on] 28.01.2014 N9
01.02.2015 185 131
Prikaz RAR ot [Order of the Expert Council of the Federal
Service for Alcohol Market Regulation on] 25.12.2014 N409
Table A3: Minimum Retailing Price values
Source: Expert Council of the Federal Service for Alcohol Market
Regulation
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
beer,gr dry wine, gr fortified wine, gr moonshin, gr vodka, gr
beer, rub 0.014 -0.105 -0.065 -0.760 -0.165
(0.077) (0.095) (0.161) (0.195) (0.072)
dry wine, rub 0.071 0.009 0.349* 0.598* 0.166
(0.121) (0.161) (0.203) (0.317) (0.114)
fortified wine, rub -0.023 0.070 -0.835*** -0.590 -0.085
(0.067) (0.092) (0.189) (0.374) (0.115)
vodka, rub 0.083 -0.025 0.596*** 0.302 0.137
(0.067) (0.092) (0.176) (0.188) (0.088)
policy -0.053 -0.061 -0.025 -0.136 -0.095
(0.053) (0.078) (0.133) (0.189) (0.076)
gender (male) 0.529*** 0.242*** 0.430*** 0.472*** 0.542***
(0.023) (0.044) (0.053) (0.072) (0.019)
age group 1 (26-45) -0.001 0.021 -0.104 -0.055 0.011
(0.033) (0.066) (0.108) (0.156) (0.057)
age group 2 (46-59) -0.173*** -0.158** -0.213 -0.013 -0.058
(0.037) (0.064) (0.134) (0.166) (0.060)
policy*age group 1 0.048 0.009 0.089 0.255 0.115
(0.046) (0.077) (0.120) (0.189) (0.075)
policy*age group 2 0.084* 0.108 0.110 0.205 0.103
(0.047) (0.076) (0.143) (0.204) (0.070)
policy*gender (male) -0.004 -0.065 -0.057 -0.025 -0.038*
(0.023) (0.051) (0.060) (0.063) (0.023)
alcohol consumer, lag 0.141*** 0.098*** 0.104** 0.117* 0.118***
(0.024) (0.029) (0.046) (0.065) (0.027)
educ. years -0.014*** -0.004 -0.023*** -0.031*** -0.020***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.011) (0.004)
married -0.072*** -0.051 -0.108** -0.245*** -0.074**
(0.024) (0.062) (0.052) (0.077) (0.034)
divorced 0.023 0.005 0.015 0.016 0.035
(0.028) (0.061) (0.062) (0.089) (0.038)
widowed/er 0.034 0.063 0.046 -0.194* -0.001
(0.046) (0.062) (0.092) (0.116) (0.052)
household income -0.010 -0.003 -0.012 -0.021* -0.007
(0.006) (0.008) (0.014) (0.012) (0.005)
household income, lag -0.010* 0.013*** -0.026** 0.001 -0.013***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.011) (0.013) (0.005)
job -0.031 -0.030 -0.072 -0.136** -0.083***
(0.020) (0.029) (0.045) (0.058) (0.020)
job, lag -0.035** 0.031 0.009 -0.083* -0.053**
(0.018) (0.030) (0.061) (0.046) (0.022)
number of kids -0.035*** -0.053*** -0.021 -0.033** -0.008
(0.010) (0.020) (0.023) (0.016) (0.011)
maternity leave -0.023 0.098** 0.079 0.407*** 0.085*
(0.048) (0.037) (0.101) (0.142) (0.046)
health status 0.022* -0.026 0.019 0.045 -0.011
(0.013) (0.020) (0.034) (0.043) (0.014)
cold water 0.029 0.036 0.055 0.017 -0.031
(0.024) (0.056) (0.086) (0.079) (0.029)
sewerage -0.066*** 0.018 -0.036 -0.033 0.038
(0.025) (0.037) (0.062) (0.061) (0.028)
heat -0.002 -0.030 -0.013 0.037 -0.010
(0.020) (0.026) (0.056) (0.067) (0.026)
hot water 0.049* 0.016 0.059 -0.008 -0.008
(0.028) (0.040) (0.058) (0.056) (0.023)
GRP 0.017 0.340** -0.091 0.233 0.040
(0.086) (0.135) (0.171) (0.234) (0.079)
N 12,405 5,298 1,852 1,162 10,867
R2 0.176 0.047 0.117 0.220 0.173
1 robust standard errors;
2 consumption, price, income, and GRP values are in the log form.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table A4: The effect of MRP policy on alcohol consumption by the type of drink. OLS with community
fixed effect, full table
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
beer, gr dry wine, gr fortified wine, gr moonshine, gr vodka, gr
beer, rub 0.065 -0.437 0.213 -0.874 -0.167
(0.111) (0.226) (0.419) (0.266) (0.093)
dry wine, rub -0.008 -0.153 0.253 0.100*** 0.084
(0.155) (0.415) (0.617) (0.349) (0.116)
fortified wine, rub -0.043 0.402 -0.894** -0.813 -0.061
(0.090) (0.262) (0.447) (0.196) (0.122)
vodka, rub 0.105 -0.349 0.698** 0.350 0.171
(0.078) (0.204) (0.305) (0.219) (0.193)
policy -0.027 0.076 0.0494* -0.129 -0.107
(0.078) (0.263) (0.265) (0.176) (0.075)
age group 1 (26-45) -0.012 0.205 0.379** 0.059 -0.014
(0.059) (0.228) (0.160) (0.107) (0.061)
age group 2 (45-59) -0.144*** 0.049 0.347** 0.113 -0.041
(0.055) (0.222) (0.155) (0.115) (0.066)
policy*age group 1 0.027 -0.214 -0.405* 0.186 0.098
(0.067) (0.254) (0.240) (0.156) (0.077)
policy*age group 2 0.050 -0.103 -0.433* 0.160 0.072
(0.068) (0.258) (0.226) (0.160) (0.073)
alcohol consumer, 1ag 0.074** 0.021 0.046 0.081 0.040
(0.033) (0.076) (0.128) (0.069) (0.033)
educ. years -0.011*** -0.006 -0.037*** -0.025** -0.016***
(0.003) (0.008) (0.014) (0.012) (0.004)
married -0.055 0.034 -0.244 -0.220*** -0.045
(0.036) (0.166) (0.147) (0.074) (0.049)
divorced 0.015 0.159 -0.034 0.079 0.089*
(0.041) (0.180) (0.133) (0.086) (0.051)
widower -0.019 -0.570** -0.927*** -0.084 -0.087
(0.074) (0.253) (0.183) (0.145) (0.118)
household income -0.010 0.005 -0.077* -0.013 -0.008
(0.007) (0.014) (0.043) (0.011) (0.008)
household income, lag -0.013 0.021 -0.034 0.007 -0.017**
(0.009) (0.014) (0.020) (0.018) (0.007)
job -0.031 0.097 0.032 -0.158** -0.082***
(0.028) (0.119) (0.089) (0.070) (0.027)
job, lag -0.019 -0.092 -0.075 -0.066 -0.043
(0.026) (0.090) (0.097) (0.058) (0.026)
number of kids -0.023* -0.086** -0.076 -0.051** -0.017
(0.012) (0.037) (0.052) (0.020) (0.012)
health status 0.032* -0.029 -0.041 0.014 -0.024
(0.017) (0.045) (0.061) (0.047) (0.016)
cold water 0.060** 0.013 -0.137 0.029 -0.027
(0.030) (0.170) (0.115) (0.098) (0.036)
sewerage -0.076* 0.264** 0.071 -0.069 0.070**
(0.041) (0.104) (0.150) (0.068) (0.030)
heating 0.009 -0.039 -0.108 0.036 -0.021
(0.031) (0.069) (0.108) (0.075) (0.029)
hot water 0.043 -0.263*** 0.199* 0.004 -0.050*
(0.039) (0.096) (0.107) (0.060) (0.028)
GRP 0.016 0.769*** -0.253 0.180 0.030
(0.096) (0.274) (0.425) (0.241) (0.087)
N 7,531 1,045 566 874 7,250
R2 0.022 0.049 0.106 0.120 0.028
1 robust standard errors;
2 consumption, price, income, and GRP values are in the log form.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table A5: The effect of MRP policy on male alcohol consumption by the type of drink. OLS with
community fixed effect, full table
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
beer, gr dry wine, gr fortified wine, gr moonshine, gr vodka, gr
beer, rub -0.053 -0.029 -0.164 -0.430 -0.168
(0.081) (0.090) (0.243) (0.279) (0.071)
dry wine, rub 0.178 0.041 0.454* -0.104 0.393**
(0.151) (0.184) (0.258) (0.127) (0.193)
fortified wine, rub 0.011 0.022 -0.801*** -0.042 -0.144
(0.092) (0.095) (0.261) (0.429) (0.158)
vodka, rub 0.034 0.048 0.427** 0.540 0.010
(0.093) (0.101) (0.187) (0.368) (0.112)
policy -0.095 -0.078 -0.155 -0.202 -0.116
(0.076) (0.072) (0.152) (0.319) (0.161)
age group 1 (26-45) 0.017 -0.017 -0.204 -0.361 0.054
(0.042) (0.065) (0.132) (0.232) (0.101)
age group 2 (46-54) -0.262*** -0.200*** -0.361** -0.286 -0.099
(0.053) (0.066) (0.145) (0.228) (0.104)
policy*age group 1 0.062 0.030 0.171 0.647** 0.129
(0.063) (0.076) (0.139) (0.303) (0.148)
policy*age group 2 0.116* 0.122* 0.196 0.355 0.120
(0.066) (0.073) (0.151) (0.312) (0.151)
alcohol consumer, lag 0.202*** 0.112*** 0.142*** 0.118 0.233***
(0.036) (0.031) (0.053) (0.140) (0.044)
educ. years -0.020*** -0.003 -0.015* -0.060*** -0.027***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.020) (0.005)
married -0.096** -0.053 -0.093* -0.097 -0.097*
(0.043) (0.065) (0.055) (0.150) (0.054)
divorced 0.025 0.003 -0.016 -0.006 -0.024
(0.046) (0.062) (0.078) (0.179) (0.060)
widowed 0.080 0.093 0.119 -0.168 0.020
(0.059) (0.058) (0.091) (0.192) (0.065)
household income -0.008 -0.001 -0.009 -0.051 -0.002
(0.009) (0.007) (0.017) (0.038) (0.006)
household income, lag -0.006 0.011** -0.020 -0.016 -0.005
(0.005) (0.005) (0.014) (0.027) (0.009)
job -0.039 -0.047 -0.046 0.019 -0.086**
(0.032) (0.030) (0.049) (0.081) (0.038)
job, lag -0.049* 0.057* 0.052 -0.189*** -0.055
(0.026) (0.032) (0.067) (0.067) (0.034)
number of kids -0.045*** -0.043** 0.001 0.082* 0.008
(0.015) (0.019) (0.022) (0.045) (0.018)
maternity leave -0.071 0.097*** 0.048 0.233 0.031
(0.051) (0.036) (0.108) (0.184) (0.050)
health status 0.010 -0.032 0.049 0.195* 0.007
(0.017) (0.023) (0.041) (0.109) (0.021)
cold water -0.004 0.025 0.123 -0.007 -0.049
(0.034) (0.051) (0.099) (0.112) (0.045)
sewerage -0.047* -0.023 -0.078 -0.155 -0.025
(0.027) (0.038) (0.081) (0.183) (0.053)
heat -0.022 -0.034 -0.022 0.358*** 0.018
(0.032) (0.027) (0.069) (0.131) (0.039)
hot water 0.051 0.071* 0.037 -0.151 0.065
(0.032) (0.039) (0.070) (0.120) (0.044)
GRP 0.071 0.222 0.120 0.302 0.073
(0.121) (0.135) (0.182) (0.380) (0.123)
N 4,874 4,253 1,286 288 3,617
R2 0.058 0.038 0.049 0.253 0.053
1 robust standard errors;
2 consumption, price, income, and GRP values are in the log form.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table A6: The effect of MRP policy on female alcohol consumption by the type of drink. OLS with
community fixed effect, full table
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
beer, gr dry wine, gr fortified wine, gr moonshine, gr vodka, gr
beer, rub 0.036 -0.138 0.043 -0.746 -0.160
(0.077) (0.118) (0.174) (0.168) (0.070)
dry wine, rub 0.027 -0.040 0.187 0.660** 0.117
(0.113) (0.157) (0.212) (0.259) (0.113)
fortified wine, rub 0.033 0.126 -0.714*** -0.646 -0.024
(0.068) (0.101) (0.203) (0.196) (0.117)
vodka, rub 0.054 -0.044 0.500** 0.446** 0.106
(0.070) (0.101) (0.195) (0.225) (0.090)
policy -0.061 -0.095 -0.083 -0.174 -0.085
(0.056) (0.078) (0.144) (0.188) (0.082)
gender (male) 0.532*** 0.246*** 0.437*** 0.489*** 0.538***
(0.025) (0.048) (0.064) (0.077) (0.020)
age group 1 (26-45) -0.009 -0.005 -0.076 -0.004 0.037
(0.037) (0.065) (0.108) (0.162) (0.067)
age group 2 (46-59) -0.166*** -0.180** -0.249* -0.008 -0.051
(0.040) (0.069) (0.133) (0.175) (0.070)
policy*age group 1 0.062 0.035 0.076 0.269 0.084
(0.051) (0.078) (0.126) (0.199) (0.080)
policy*age group 2 0.089* 0.145* 0.147 0.263 0.095
(0.052) (0.080) (0.155) (0.211) (0.074)
policy*gender (male) -0.008 -0.077 -0.035 -0.008 -0.035
(0.024) (0.054) (0.065) (0.078) (0.023)
alcohol consumer, lag 0.129*** 0.089*** 0.080* 0.130* 0.129***
(0.024) (0.033) (0.042) (0.074) (0.027)
educ. years -0.015*** -0.005 -0.023*** -0.032** -0.021***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.007) (0.012) (0.004)
married -0.071** -0.045 -0.099* -0.221*** -0.074*
(0.028) (0.055) (0.056) (0.083) (0.038)
divorced 0.013 -0.007 0.033 -0.009 0.038
(0.031) (0.052) (0.064) (0.095) (0.040)
widowed/er 0.012 0.067 0.013 -0.132 -0.007
(0.053) (0.063) (0.101) (0.126) (0.052)
household income -0.008 -0.004 -0.007 -0.022* -0.005
(0.007) (0.008) (0.014) (0.012) (0.006)
household income, lag -0.010** 0.014*** -0.028** 0.005 -0.011**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.012) (0.014) (0.006)
job -0.043* -0.033 -0.076 -0.144* -0.082***
(0.023) (0.030) (0.048) (0.075) (0.022)
job, lag -0.041** 0.030 0.010 -0.102* -0.050**
(0.018) (0.035) (0.064) (0.061) (0.024)
number of kids -0.035*** -0.051** -0.012 -0.039* 0.000
(0.011) (0.021) (0.024) (0.020) (0.011)
maternity leave -0.022 0.130*** 0.066 0.357* 0.116**
(0.052) (0.043) (0.107) (0.185) (0.057)
health status 0.012 -0.026 0.026 0.024 -0.009
(0.013) (0.023) (0.035) (0.047) (0.014)
cold water 0.026 0.023 0.056 -0.005 -0.028
(0.028) (0.063) (0.086) (0.079) (0.030)
sewerage -0.069*** 0.010 -0.028 0.058 0.032
(0.025) (0.044) (0.069) (0.065) (0.030)
heating 0.006 -0.015 -0.017 -0.021 -0.021
(0.020) (0.030) (0.063) (0.073) (0.027)
hot water 0.041 0.015 0.047 -0.012 -0.009
(0.027) (0.046) (0.061) (0.064) (0.023)
GRP -0.009 0.392*** 0.031 0.144 0.056
(0.084) (0.144) (0.176) (0.291) (0.086)
N 11,191 4,824 1,666 939 9,349
R2 0.178 0.044 0.121 0.229 0.174
1 robust standard errors;
2 consumption, price, income, and GRP values are in the log form.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table A7: The effect of MRP policy on alcohol consumption by the type of drink for Russian nationality.
OLS with community fixed effect, full table
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
beer, gr dry wine, gr fortified wine, gr moonshine, gr vodka, gr
beer, rub -0.031 -0.166 -0.154 -0.593 -0.178
(0.083) (0.103) (0.184) (0.320) (0.075)
dry wine, rub 0.071 0.262 0.647** 0.465 0.175
(0.166) (0.188) (0.261) (0.754) (0.147)
fortified wine, rub -0.029 0.077 -0.929*** -0.398 0.019
(0.063) (0.093) (0.188) (0.334) (0.108)
vodka, rub 0.058 -0.095 0.425* 0.149 0.088
(0.086) (0.105) (0.222) (0.404) (0.120)
policy -0.081 -0.068 -0.051 -0.0564 -0.136
(0.064) (0.091) (0.144) (0.273) (0.102)
gender (male) 0.477*** 0.239*** 0.372*** 0.651*** 0.519***
(0.026) (0.050) (0.053) (0.117) (0.020)
age group 1 (26-45) -0.029 0.021 -0.161 -0.402* 0.003
(0.038) (0.076) (0.133) (0.230) (0.079)
age group 2 (46-59) -0.220*** -0.172** -0.319* -0.357 -0.071
(0.042) (0.071) (0.161) (0.274) (0.083)
policy*age group 1 0.047 0.009 0.080 0.657** 0.145
(0.056) (0.088) (0.118) (0.285) (0.102)
policy*age group 2 0.101* 0.116 0.157 0.646* 0.132
(0.056) (0.089) (0.146) (0.341) (0.095)
policy*gender (male) 0.008 -0.066 -0.026 -0.091 -0.015
(0.028) (0.057) (0.068) (0.104) (0.027)
alcohol consumer, lag 0.141*** 0.103*** 0.073 0.046 0.163***
(0.032) (0.035) (0.063) (0.126) (0.034)
educ. years -0.015*** -0.006 -0.025*** -0.040** -0.020***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.008) (0.019) (0.005)
married -0.058** -0.029 -0.061 -0.448** -0.059
(0.027) (0.072) (0.059) (0.167) (0.038)
divorced 0.034 0.013 0.075 -0.219 0.040
(0.033) (0.071) (0.071) (0.194) (0.043)
widowed/er 0.021 0.075 0.121 -0.513* -0.021
(0.059) (0.073) (0.113) (0.258) (0.068)
household income -0.004 -0.002 -0.015 -0.025** -0.002
(0.007) (0.008) (0.017) (0.011) (0.005)
household income, lag -0.009 0.013** -0.030* -0.004 -0.015**
(0.006) (0.005) (0.015) (0.019) (0.006)
job -0.018 -0.018 -0.015 -0.133 -0.072**
(0.027) (0.034) (0.055) (0.150) (0.027)
job, lag -0.044* 0.012 -0.088 -0.029 -0.078**
(0.022) (0.035) (0.074) (0.112) (0.029)
number of kids -0.039*** -0.073*** -0.049 -0.102** -0.017
(0.011) (0.024) (0.038) (0.042) (0.016)
maternity leave 0.002 0.061 0.069 0.514 0.085
(0.058) (0.043) (0.119) (0.307) (0.053)
health status 0.024 -0.054** -0.012 0.059 -0.009
(0.015) (0.022) (0.040) (0.081) (0.017)
cold water 0.031 0.050 -0.001 0.092 -0.048*
(0.029) (0.061) (0.104) (0.176) (0.026)
sewer -0.093*** 0.017 -0.050 -0.011 0.032
(0.029) (0.046) (0.068) (0.158) (0.036)
heating 0.018 -0.041 -0.012 -0.044 -0.016
(0.023) (0.028) (0.070) (0.156) (0.032)
hot water 0.059 0.051 0.065 0.123 -0.002
(0.038) (0.054) (0.076) (0.142) (0.028)
GRP 0.133 0.284 0.175 0.366 0.022
(0.111) (0.170) (0.216) (0.499) (0.101)
N 8,723 4,208 1,289 484 7,528
R2 0.156 0.050 0.110 0.254 0.168
1 robust standard errors;
2 consumption, price, income, and GRP values are in the log form.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table A8: The effect of MRP policy on alcohol consumption by the type of drink for urban citizens. OLS
with community fixed effect, full table, full table
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
beer, gr dry wine, gr fortified wine, gr moonshine, gr vodka, gr
beer, rub 0.283 0.382 0.375 -0.139 -0.022
(0.149) (0.255) (0.493) (0.323) (0.165)
dry wine, rub -0.001 -0.478* -0.208 0.100 0.212
(0.189) (0.272) (0.405) (0.319) (0.186)
fortified wine, rub -0.050 -0.240 -0.345 -0.872 -0.545
(0.244) (0.385) (0.526) (0.314) (0.215)
vodka, rub 0.121 0.172 0.544* 0.559*** 0.263
(0.112) (0.244) (0.280) (0.205) (0.128)
policy -0.024 -0.014 -0.157 0.122 0.022
(0.102) (0.164) (0.224) (0.203) (0.103)
gender (male) 0.661*** 0.271** 0.632*** 0.361*** 0.598***
(0.043) (0.106) (0.117) (0.061) (0.041)
age group 1 (26-45) 0.065 0.047 -0.094 0.157 0.048
(0.061) (0.132) (0.185) (0.169) (0.077)
age group 2 (46-59) -0.066 -0.071 -0.116 0.165 -0.006
(0.070) (0.140) (0.226) (0.153) (0.077)
policy*age group 1 0.065 -0.000 0.198 0.095 0.023
(0.084) (0.172) (0.237) (0.190) (0.099)
policy*age group 2 0.063 0.062 0.119 0.069 0.017
(0.090) (0.167) (0.265) (0.179) (0.098)
policy*gender (male) -0.030 -0.015 -0.190* -0.034 -0.096**
(0.044) (0.134) (0.114) (0.081) (0.046)
alcohol consumer, lag 0.130*** 0.085 0.139** 0.160** 0.052
(0.041) (0.052) (0.067) (0.078) (0.040)
educ. years -0.013** 0.004 -0.016 -0.011 -0.023***
(0.005) (0.008) (0.012) (0.011) (0.005)
married -0.115** -0.143*** -0.171 -0.176* -0.103
(0.054) (0.045) (0.104) (0.098) (0.076)
divorced -0.026 -0.052 -0.135 0.110 0.029
(0.052) (0.048) (0.111) (0.085) (0.074)
widowed/er 0.048 -0.007 -0.055 -0.125 0.027
(0.076) (0.089) (0.156) (0.138) (0.087)
household income -0.036*** -0.019 0.015 -0.019 -0.028
(0.012) (0.030) (0.031) (0.024) (0.018)
household income, lag -0.010 0.021 -0.012 -0.005 -0.006
(0.010) (0.026) (0.016) (0.018) (0.007)
job -0.044 -0.082 -0.214*** -0.120** -0.095***
(0.030) (0.056) (0.075) (0.054) (0.032)
job, lag -0.025 0.105 0.189* -0.108** -0.026
(0.027) (0.064) (0.097) (0.041) (0.031)
number of ids -0.028* 0.003 0.018 0.002 0.004
(0.017) (0.030) (0.020) (0.013) (0.016)
maternity leave -0.106 0.224*** 0.138 0.371*** 0.087
(0.087) (0.081) (0.222) (0.098) (0.094)
health status 0.020 0.095*** 0.092 0.047 -0.017
(0.026) (0.035) (0.063) (0.055) (0.024)
cold water 0.038 -0.009 0.129 -0.082 0.001
(0.045) (0.073) (0.156) (0.062) (0.058)
sewerage 0.018 0.110* -0.003 -0.081 0.078
(0.050) (0.063) (0.108) (0.070) (0.047)
heating -0.081* 0.005 -0.028 0.114 0.004
(0.041) (0.065) (0.093) (0.071) (0.042)
hot water 0.053 -0.062 0.039 -0.046 -0.014
(0.048) (0.054) (0.088) (0.066) (0.036)
GRP -0.210 0.344 -0.470 0.080 0.124
(0.133) (0.218) (0.304) (0.206) (0.131)
N 3,682 1,090 563 678 3,339
R2 0.238 0.077 0.223 0.235 0.201
1 robust standard errors;
2 consumption, price, income, and GRP values are in the log form.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table A9: The effect of MRP policy on alcohol consumption by the type of drink for rural citizens. OLS
with community fixed effect, full table
